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TheEx Ante Quality of Direct
Placements, 1951-61 Avery B. Cohan
INTRODUCTION
The ideal measure of the ex ante quality of any debt instrument is,
as Macaulay pointed out nearly thirty years ago, the probability that
interest and principal will be paid in full and on time.' This measure
is "ideal" for two primary reasons: first,probabilitieswould take ac-
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count of expected economic conditions—as underlying ratios(e.g.,
times charges earned, debt-equity ratios, and so forth) either separately
or combined in some way, cannot; and economic conditions are prob-
ably more important than the intrinsic chararteristics of an issue in
determining whether that issue will fault during its life and, if so, to
what degree. Second, probabilities are continuous and cardinal, not
discrete and ordinal as are, for example, agency ratings.
There is also a third reason, albeit of a somewhat different order: if
lenders, in the process of assessing a new issue, thought of ex ante
quality as a probability, and proceeded to articulate the probability,
as defined above, appropriate to that issue, they would be led directly to
the yield they should require on that issue.2
Presumably, when Macaulay used the term "probability" he meant
objective(not subjective)probability—as with a fair coin tossed
under ideal conditions. But a debt instrument is not a coin, and although
objective probabilities for debt instruments must in fact exist, no attempt
has been made to unearth them.3 This study, using a sample of direct
placements, attempts to derive the subjective probabilities present in
the minds of lenders when the direct placements in question were
bought.4 This study is admittedly exploratory, and the results are valid
only to the degree that the following proposition is valid: the subjec-
tive probability can be derived from the ratio of the return on a govern-
ment bond to the return on a direct placement of the same maturity—
provided that the ratio is adjusted for "extraneous influences"(e.g.,
differential call deferment) and provided also that various assumptions
about the characteristics of the relevant portions of the market for
long-term corporate capital are satisfied.
Before discussing the "extraneous influences" and the assumptions,
it will be worthwhile to speculate on how the subjective probabilities
might be formulated and used by lenders. The subjective probability,
which is the object of study here, is the product of two subsidiary proba-
If, for example, the probability that all payments on a proposed new ten-
year issue would be made on time were estimated to be .895, and the prevailing
yield on ten-year riskiess securities were 5.00 per cent, the required return on
the new issue would be approximately 1.0617 (see below, p. 285 if.).
Some progress might be made in this direction by using the data, covering
the period 1900—43, amassed by the National Bureau's Bond Project.
Direct placements are long-term loans made directlyto business by life
insurance companies and pension and mutual funds. For a detailed definition,
see Avery B. Cohan, Yields on Corporate Debt Directly Placed, New York,
NBER, 1967, pp. 8—11.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 283
bilities, namely, (1) the probability that a proposed new issue with
specific characteristics will be paid off in full and on time provided given
economic conditions prevail during its life, and (2) the probability that
such economic conditions will in fact prevail. Table 5-1 illustrates
(albeit in a highly simplified situation) the process of using the two
subsidiary probabilities to reach the probability implicit, as above, in
the relationship between the return on a government bond and the
return on a direct placement of the same maturity. For the purposes
TABLE 5-1. Illustration of Calculation on Hypothetical Issue, of Prob-
ability of Repayment in Full and on Time
State of Naturea p p px p3
1. Continuous growth,
no recessions .25 .95 .2375
2. Steady upward trend,
periodic minor recessions .65 .80 .5 200
3. Steady upward trend,
periodic minor recessions,
one severe depression .10 .50 .0500 •
Total 1.00 .8075
NOTE: P1 =theprobability of each state of nature; P2 =theprobability for
repayment in full and on time, for a given state of nature.
aSee text explanation.
of the illustration three possible economic climates ("states of nature")
are postulated to prevail during the life of the debt instrument in
question: (1) continuous growth in real GNP at full employment, no
recessions; (2) steady upward trend in real GNP, periodic minor
recessions with moderate (6—7percent) unemployment; and (3)
steady upward trend in real GNP, periodic minor recessions, as above,
one severe depression lasting 12—18 months with peak unemployment
of 12—14 per cent.
These three"statesof nature"are,of course, assumed to be
mutually exclusive and no other "states of nature" are assumed to be
possible. The sum of the probabilities under P1 in Table 5-1 is thus
1.00. These probabilities simply quantify the hypothetical lender's ex-
pectations about the economic atmosphere that will prevail during
the life of the debt instrument. The probabilities under P2 in Table284 Essays on Interest Rates
5-1 are the probabilities, subjectively formulated by the hypothetical
lender, that all payments of interest and principal will be made in full
and on time, given the corresponding state of nature. These probabili-
ties are thus conditional. They do not add to
Where do the probabilities under P2 (in column 2) come from
and what do they really mean? In order to answer these questions we
assume a ten-year issue, interest and principal payable annually, and
a highly knowledgeable, sophisticated,and systematic lender! The
lender, after formulating the probabilities in column I(Pr), examines
the proposed issue and asks himself what the probability is that such
an issue would meet its first payment, at some assumed rate of interest
and schedule of amortization, given the first "state of nature." He
reflects on the history of issues of this general type and decides that
the probability is high, .995. He then asks himself what probability
should be attached to the second payment, given that the first has
been made in full and on time. He decides that it also is .995. And
so forth for each of the succeeding eight years (the successive proba-
bilities need not be the same: they can either rise or decline or take
on any movement whatever) •6Then,in order to ascertain the proba-
bility that all payments will be made in full and on time, he multiplies
all ten conditional probabilities together. If he has chosen probabilities
that are all equal he need only raise .995 to the tenth power. In Table
5-1 the product of the ten probabilities is equal to (.995)10or.950.
The latter figure is then the probability that all payments will be made
in full and on time given the first state of nature. The lender then
repeats the process for each of the other two states of nature, does
the necessary arithmetic, and obtains the final probability, .8075, given
at the bottom of column 3 of Table 5-1. This is the probability we
The analogy is with a game under the rules of which the player draws first
from an urn containing 25 red balls, 65 green balls, and 10 white balls. The
probability that the player will draw a red, green, or white ball is1.00. If he
draws a red ball he then draws from an urn containing 95 $10 bills and S
pieces of paper bearing the legend: go back to start. If he draws a green ball
he then draws from an urn containing 80 $10 bills and 20 pieces of paper
bearing the above legend. If he draws a white ball he draws from an urn
containing 50 $10 bills and 50 pieces of paper. The conditional probabilities that
he will draw a $10 bill on his second draw are thus, respectively, .95, .80, and
.50. The probability, at the start of the game, that he will draw a $10 billis
therefore .8075.
The subjective probabilities fixed,at any given time on any given issue,
separately by a number of lenders would presumably fluctuate normally about
their mean.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 285
are here trying to derive, i.e., the subjective probability that all pay-
ments will be made in full and on time—whatever the state of nature.
A few comments on the foregoing "description" of the "lending
process" are perhaps in order:
(1) The description sounds artificial: few lenders,if any, would
go through the kind of deliberate process described above and few,.
if any, would so much as think in terms of probabilities. Yet all the
probabilities illustrated in Table 5-1 are implicit in every yield every
lender sets—given the rate on riskiess securities of the same maturity
as the proposed
(2) The final probability, .8075 in the illustration, can be used
explicitly to fix the return(i.e.,1 +yield)on the proposed issue,
given the return prevailing on riskless securities of the same maturity as
the proposed new issue. The lender knows, if be is sensible, that on
the average he cannot expect to earn more than the return on com-
parable riskiess securities—if he lends in a competitive market.8 He
therefore uses the rate on comparable riskless securities as his discount
rate. He then sets up the following present value equation:
—rP1+
r(P1P2)++(1 + r)(P1P2...
—1+ g(1 + g)2 (1 + g)'°
where r is the coupon on the proposed new issue; g is the prevailing
rate on governments of the same maturity; and P1, P2,..., P10
are the annual probabilities described above, .979 in the illustration.9
The foregoing equation simply means that the present value of the
future payments on the proposed new issue cannot exceed the present
value of the future payments on a government security of the same
maturity.
The lender can now proceed in either of two ways: he can solve
for r iteratively or he can solve, in general terms, for P and then solve
for r. The latter course is simpler. Solving for P gives:
1+r
if all the conditional P's (P1, P2,..., P = P1
P2... P10.If the P1, P2,..., Piodiffer among themselves, P is
Regardless of the proposed amortization schedule of the proposed new
issue—provided only that the two maturities are the same.
RThismatter is discussed further below.
°Actually,in the illustration, P'° =.8075 and '°V.8075= .979.286 Essays on Interest Rates
simply the nth root of their product or, in the above illustration, •979•b0
Nowthat the lender knows that P = (1 + g)/(1 + r), he can
obtain r readily. Substituting the simple probability obtained in the
illustration above('°-y'.8075 =.979),and assuming that ten-year
governments are selling to return 1.04, r (the required yield on the
proposed issue) is 6.23 per cent approximately." Again, few lenders,
if any, go through this process explicitly but each and every one of
them, with no exceptions, and whether they know itor not, go
through it implicitly. Even if a lender does nothing but look at an
issue casually and then fix a yield on it, he is making implicit assump-
tions about the probabilities described above.12
The proposed new issue would not be identical to governments in
certain "extraneous" ways. The lender might want protection against
call and if he did he would have to reduce his required yield accord-
ingly. In addition, he would want to be compensated for that part of
the cost of running his investment department that he would not incur
if he bought only governments. Also, if he happened to be poorly
diversified and therefore risk averse, or if he were risk averse for any
other reason, he might seek additional yield on that account. But in
any case, working from the underlying probabilities and the return on
governments of the same maturity as the proposed new issue, he could
determine an appropriate yield on the new issue and adjust, according
to his disposition, for call, risk preference, and so forth.13
The raw materials of this study are the returns, i.e., the (1 + r) 's
and the (1 + g) 's. In effect we are trying to reverse the process de-
scribed above: instead of deriving the return (or the yield) from the
subjective probabilities, as above, we attempt here to derive the sub-
jective probabilities from the returns. However, the observed returns,
as the foregoing illustration makes clear, reflect the effect of various
10(979)10= .8075.
1.041.979=1.0623.
12Theprocess is, of course, a trial-and-error process: in order to assign the
initial F's, the lender would have to assume a coupon rate and amortization
schedule. He would proceed to obtain a required yield and if this yield and
the yield assumed were materially different, he would assume a yield somewhere
between the yieldinitially assumed and the tentative required yield and go
through the process again. He proceed by this process of successive
approximation until the two yields were the same.
Whetherthe lender would in fact be able to obtain an extra risk aversion
premium is perhaps doubtful. This fact may explain, in part, why small insurance
companies during the period in question were, in effect, unable to bid success-
fully for direct placements.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 287
extraneous influences. And the derivation process itselfis obviously
based on a number of assumptions. And unless the ratio (1 + g) / (1
+ r) can be adjusted for extraneous influences and/or if the assump-
tions are not reasonably accurate, it (the ratio) will not be a pure risk
ratio—i.e., it will not be the probability we are seeking.
(3) The following illustration may serve to make the meaning
of the P's and the Pa's somewhat clearer. In order to keep the necessary
computations within reasonable bounds, we assume a sample of 10,000
three-year bonds, all in the same risk class, sold at the same time at
par with a coupon of 6 per cent, and that three-year governments are
selling to yield 4 per cent. We assume further that we have adjusted
the yield on the risky bonds for extraneous influences and, of course,
that the various necessary assumptions are satisfied. We invest $1 in
each bond.
First, we obtain the average probability by dividing (1 + g) by
(1 + r) and find that it is approximately .9811. Second, we set up









=566.04+ 534.00 + 8,899.99
=10,000(10,000.03)
Howshould this result be interpreted? On its face, the result means
that of the 10,000 bonds 189 will not make either the first payment
or any subsequent payment. Of the 9811 remaining alive at the end
of the first period, 185 will not make the second or third payments.
And of the 9,626 remaining alive at the end of the second period,
181 will not make the final payment. But obviously, we need not
interpret the probabilities in this rigid way: we could assume merely
that the interest payments on all bonds in the first period would total
$588.68 (.98113 x$600)and that, in the second period, they would
total $577.57 [(.98113)2 X 600] and that interest and principal in
the final period would total $10,011.28 X $10,600]. But
this is merely one particular example of the most general case, namely,
that the cash inflows on the risky bond, discounted at the rate on risk-
less securities of the same maturity, must be equal to one times the
Torepeat:thisassumptionisnotnecessary—providedonlythat
P1 X P2 X P3 =P3or, in this case, .9445.288 Essays on Interest Rates
number of dollars invested—in this case $10,000. And the ratio
(1 +g)/(1+r)simply measures the extent to which the promised
cash flows are expected to be reduced in order that the above equality
will hold. In other words, the actual cash flows can assume any pattern
or shape whatsoever: some of the 10,000 bonds may default and be
subsequently "worked out," some may be a total loss, some may
merely be late in paying interest or principal, and so forth, provided
only that (1 +r)P(1 +g).We could say, as above, that 10,000
—P(10,000) tells us how many bonds will be a total loss,i.e., will
make no payments at all, namely, 189. But we could also say that P
tells us how much of the original expected cash inflow, $11,800
appropriately discounted, is not really expected to be received, namely,
$1,800, so that the actual present value of the group of 10,000 bonds
would really be expected to be $10,000—or the present value of
$10,000 invested in riskiess securities of the same maturity.
(4)The final compound probabilities(the figure .8075 at the
bottom of Table 5-1) are fairly sensitive to the values of the sub-
sidiaryprobabilities.If,for example, the probability ofstateof
nature number 1 had been fixed at zero and the probability of state
of nature number 2 correspondingly raised to .90, the other proba-
bilities remaining the same, the final compound probability would
have been reduced to about .77. If the probabilities of state of nature
numbers 2 and 3 had been fixed, respectively, at .80 and .20, the
final probability would have been about .74.
The next. section of the paper summarizes findings. The section
thereafter examines, in some detail, the extraneous influences and the
assumptions. We then derive and adjust the average and compound
probabilities. The final section evaluates the results.
SUMMARY
This study does, essentially, four things:(1)It attempts to assess
the effect of the extraneous influences on the yield differential between
corporates and governments; (2)it suggests a new measure of the
quality of new corporate debt issues, namely, the probability that
all payments of interest and principal will be made in full and on
time; (3) It computes this measure quarterly for a large sample of
the direct placements bought by life insurance companies during the
period 1951—61, separately for industrials, utilities, and finance corn-Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 289
pany issues; (4)It adjusts the results for what appear, in fact, to
•be the two most important extraneous influences, namely, the effect
on yields on direct placement of (a) risk-aversion on the part of
the life insurance companies and (b)differential call deferment as
between direct placements and governments.
The findings will be of primary interest to policy makers, students
of the business cycle, and regulatory agencies. They will perhaps also
be of interest to .investors and to those scholars and practitioners who
are interested in developing better measures of the quality of both
new and outstanding credit instruments.
The conclusions are:(1) Of the various extraneous influences,
only two are likely to affect the probabilities in a significant way for
the present purpose, namely,differencesincallprovisions when
yields are generally high and expected to fall, and risk aversion on
the part of lenders.
(2) Because the life insurance companies are risk averse, yield
differentials (and hence the probabilities) are sensitive to fluctuations
in the volume of lower-grade financing. In 1955—57, for example,
when the volume of lower-grade financing was very heavy, the life
insurance companies required yields on direct placements that were
substantially higher than necessary to compensate for the risk of
default alone. When the effect on the probabilities of the volume of
lower-grade financing was removed (by use of regression techniques),
they (the probabilities) rose by as much as 14 percentage points (see
Charts 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6).
(3) Long-term governmentshave,generally, much longercall
deferment than direct placements. For this reason yields on direct
placements are higher, relative to yields on governments, than they
would be on the basis of risk alone. These differences range roughly
from 5 to 40 basis points and affect the compound probabilities by
as much as 10—12 percentage points(see Charts 5-12, 5-13, and
5-14).
(4) Thequalityofdirectplacements may havedeteriorated
slightly during the period under study. The average probability, as
defined above, for the direct placements bought in 1951—53 was .807
for industrials, .809 for utilities, and .816 for finance company issues.
In 1959—61, these probabilities had declined, respectively, to .763,
.781, and .778 (see Table 5-13).
(5) For the period as a whole, average compound probabilities
were .783 for industrials,.795 forutilities,and .811 for finance290 Essays on Interest Rates
company issues(see Table 5-13). For the period1900—43, the
"realized compound probabilities"implicitinthe Hickman-Frame
results(for issues comparable, in composition, to the direct place-
ment sample) were .754 for industrials and .721 for utilities.
ASSUMPTIONS AND EXTRANEOUS INFLUENCES
As indicated above, the term "quality ex ante" is here taken to mean
the estimate, explicit or implicit, made by the lenderat time of
issue, of the probability that the promise made by the borrower will
be kept in full. This estimate, although usually based on "objective"
data (i.e., on the historical record), must be subjective because, in
its nature, it cannot be anything else:it is a subjective evaluation of
the historical record in the context of the circumstances surrounding
the purchase of the new debt instrument. And it is perfectly possible
for two identical issues, bought at different times, to have different
probabilities attached to them by lenders.
Ideally then, we are seeking, for each new issue (and for new issues
on the average), period by period, an estimate of the subjective
probability of repayment in full and on time,i.e.,the probability
that the realized yield on any bond (or group of bonds) will be equal
to the promised yield on that bond (or group of bonds). And, of
course,if we could obtain a time series of such probabilities, we
would be able to observe whether the probabilities were increasing
(higher quality)or decreasing(lower quality)
Unhappily,probabilities in the above sense, even if explicitly for-
mulated, are not part of the public record: they appear only via their
We should, of course, be very careful about the inferences we draw from
the behavior of the probabilities—afterall, from the lenders viewpoint, the
expected yield on the wcirst bonds, taken as a group, should be equal to the
rate on riskless bonds. We could say only that as quality, in the above sense,
declined, defaults per dollar of bonds bought would probably increase. But
the fact that quality,in this sense, had declined would not necessarily mean
that the insurance companies were or would be "worse off." In fact, it doubtless
means thereverse, provided yields had been properly determined on lower
quality issues:ifyields had been appropriately determined on lower quality
issues the insurance companies would be able, in effect, to invest their enormous
flows of cash to yield the current rate on riskless securities. If they tried to invest
thesecash flows directlyinriskiesssecurities,they would,doubtless,drive
yields on those securities down to a point below, probably well below, the pre-
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effect on yields. Now, assuming that bonds can be grouped into
homogeneous risk classes, the expected value of $1 worth of bonds
in any risk class should be equal to the expected value of $1 worth
of bonds in every other risk class and to the value of $1 of riskiess
bonds. This, in turn, means that the yielddifferential between a
direct placement and a government bond of the same maturity should
be a measure or an index, in some sense, of the probability we
seek, provided(1)that governments are considered by investors
to be riskless; (2) that the direct placement market is a fully com-
petitive market from the point of view of the issuer,i.e.,that no
issuer need pay more for money than the yield on governments of
the same maturity (and relevant nonquality characteristics) plus an
appropriate risk premium; (3) that the buyers of direct placements
are able to move funds freely from one type of security to another—
mortgages, direct placements, other corporates, governments—in order
to take advantage of whatever yield differentials may appear; (4)
that the direct placement and government bonds being compared
have the same nonquality characteristics; (5) that the yields being
compared are net yields, i.e., that the yield on the direct placement
is net of any cost of origination; and (6) that the buyers of direct
placements are risk neutral.
Of these six provisos, the last is perhaps the most important. If
lenders are in fact risk averse, they will tend to require, on lower-
grade securities, yields higher than necessary to compensate for the
pure risk of default alone. And if they do, the yield differentials on
which this study is based will be distorted.
But under study here are only those corporate issues (direct place-
ments) bought directly by large financial institutions rather than by
"the public." Large financial institutions ought not to have risk prefer-
ences. What, after all, is risk preference? If an investor holds a large,
diversified bond portfolio, there ought to be no real difference to him
between a riskiess bond and a very risky one, provided the degree
of risk of the risky bond has been properly assessed and the yield
on it is such that its expected value is the same as that on the riskiess
bond.'° In other words, the large investor who has sufficient cash
coming in, in each period, to meet his obligations (as the life com-
panies do) and who is able to hold, relative to total assets, small
Except to the extent that substantial defaults may be misinterpreted by
management to mean that a portfolio manager has not been doing his job
properly.292 Essays on Interest Rates
amounts of a large number of issues is really taking no risk what-
ever—provided he has properly assessed the probabilities. For such
an investor, the investment problem consists essentially in assessing
probabilities, calculating appropriate yields on new issues, forecast-
ing the future course of interest rates and "arbitraging" the market.
But, to repeat, if such investors are in fact risk averse, i.e.,if they
prefer bonds with a lower expected variance of return to bonds with
a higher expected variance of return, they will require yields higher
than necessary to compensate for pure risk alone. And hence, the
yield differential between direct placements and governments will be
higher than would otherwise be the case.
So far as the other assumptions, above, are concerned, we assume:
(1)That governments are free of the risk of fault. This assumption
seems reasonable enough.
(2) That the direct placement market is a competitive market.
It follows that no borrower has to pay more for money than the
rate on a comparable government security plus an appropriate risk
premium. This assumption does not seem unreasonable, given the
fact that the direct placement market is made up of over sixty life
insurance companies, plus a number of pension and mutual funds.
(3) Thai the large financial institutions are ableto switch the
various assets in their portfolios so as to equate yields on all types
of assets at the margin. In other words, if expected yields on direct
placements were to rise above the yield on governments (or vice
versa), the insurance companies should be free to sell mortgages or
governments or anything else in order to buy direct placements (or
in the converse case, to sell direct placements in order to buy govern-
ments). This assumption is dubious because no satisfactory secondary
markets exist in either direct placements or mortgages.
On the other hand, during the period under study here, the insur-
ance companies held a large volume of governments: $13,459 million
at the beginning of 1951 and $6,134 million at the end of
If, during the period, expected yields on direct placements had been
above yields on governments for very long, the life insurance com-
panies could have sold more governments than they actually did sell,
in order to buy direct placements. Further, if expected yields on direct
placements had been below the yield on governments for very long,
holdings of direct placements would not have increased continuously
iT The great bulk of thesesecurities were held by thesixtylargestlife
companies, i.e., by the principal purchasers of direct placements.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 293
during the period, as in fact they did. In other words, if expected
yields on direct placements had long been below the yield on govern-
ments, cash flow would not have been reinvested in direct place-
ments. And, in such case, the volume of direct placements held by
the insurance companies would have declined in at least some periods.
In fact, however, the reverse occurred.
(4) Tha.t the direct placement and government bonds being com-
pared have the same non quality characteristics. The two most im-
portant nonquality characteristics, apart from maturity, are market-
ability and callprotection. In general,direct placementsare not
marketable but usually can be called by the borrower after some
specified period of time. Government securities, on the other hand,
are highly marketable and generally cannot be called at all—they are
generally protected against call through their lives (there are occasional
exceptions: some long-term governments can be called five to ten
years prior to maturity but not before then).
The difference in call protection means that, other things being equal,
yields on governments should be lower than yields on direct place-
ments. But the amount by which they will be lower will vary depending
on expectations as to the future course of interest rates. When rates
are expected to rise, the difference on this score will be zero or negli-
gible. When rates are expected to go down, the difference may be as
much as 40 basis points.
In addition, other things being equal, yields on governments should
be lower because of their greater marketability—although it seems
likely that the insurance companies attach little if any importance to
marketability and, in order to obtain it, would be willing to sacrifice
little if any yield on the direct placements they buy. But, perhaps, some
part of the yield differential between direct placements and govern-
ments is due to differences in marketability between the two types
of securities.
No adjustment has been made here for differences in marketability
between governments and direct placements. An adjustment has, how-
ever, been made for differential call deferment on the basis of data
which has recently become available. This adjustment is admittedly
rough.18
(5) That the yields being compared are net yields.In general,
ThGordonPye, "The Value of Call Deferment on a Bond: Some Empirical
Results," Journal of Finance, December 1967,p.632. Pye's results became
available after all the basic calculations here had been done.294 Essays on Interest Rates
when an insurance company buys government securities,it has no
transactions cost and, hence, the yield offered on the government is
the net yield the insurance company actually receives. But the yields
used here on direct placements, are not net yields in the above sense:
every insurance company that is active in the direct placement market
maintains a securities department at an annual cost which is not negli-
gible in absolute terms, but which probably does not exceed one-tenth
of one per cent of funds invested each year. Thus, if net yield were
calculated taking these "transaction costs" into account, it would be
lower than the nominal yield by perhaps 8 to 10 basis points.10 In
other words, the yields on direct placements used in this study are
somewhat higher than they would have been if they could have been
put on a "net" basis.
For this reason also, then, yields on governments are somewhat
understated relative to yields on direct placements, and the measures
derived below are biased somewhat downward. No attempt has been
made to adjust for this bias.
In sum, then, the first three assumptions seem reasonable and ought
not to bias the results one way or the other. The biases introduced by
the fact that direct placements are not readily marketable and by the
differential "transactions cost" of direct placements are probably slight
and no attempt has been made to adjust for them. Adjustments have
been made, however, for "risk aversion" and for differential call defer-
ment.
Obtaining Probabilities
As indicated above, P = (1 +g)/(1+r),where r is the coupon on a
risky security with specified maturity,20 g is the yield on a government
bond of the same maturity, and P is the subjective average probability
we seek.
19Theestimate comes from trade sources. The yield on a new acquisition
of $1 with maturity of 15 years and a nominal yield of 4 per cent, would be
reduced to about 3.92 per cent if the cost of acquisition were one-tenth of one
per cent, thus:
.04 1.04
1.001= ++ 15;g ÷ .0392.
(1+g) (1 +g)
20 Virtuallyall the direct placements in the present sample were sold at par.
For those few that were not, yield rather than coupon was used.Lx Ante Quality of Direct Placements 295
Ideally, in order to obtain the P's we should take the following
steps: (1) Monthly series should be constructed for yields on govern-
ments for every maturity from five to forty years. These yields should
be free of extraneous (e.g., coupon) influences.(2) The yield on
each direct placement should be adjusted to make it comparable with
the yield on a riskiess security of the same maturity, in terms of call
provisions and the other extraneous influences.2'(3) Each of the
riskiess yields, so obtained, should be divided by the yield on each
direct placement bought in the same month and of the same maturity,
e.g., the yield in January 1951 on riskiess securities of maturity of ten
years should be divided by the yield on each direct placement bought
in the same month of maturity of ten years, and so forth, for each
other maturity and each other month. The output of this process would
be a "probability," in the above sense, for each direct placement bought
in each month. (4) Each probability, so obtained, should then be
raised to the power,where n is maturity. The resulting number
would be the probability that the final payment would be made on
time, given that all prior payments had been made on time. (5) Each
such probability should then be weighted by the size of the issue and
averaged by period (quarterly). The resulting weighted average proba-
bilities would constitute an estimate of the over-all quality of the
"aggregate direct placement" bought by the life insurance companies
in each period.
In essence, the procedure which has been used is as follows: (1)
Using the monthly series by maturity on long-term governments con-
structed by the Morgan Guaranty Trust, we have obtained simple
probabilities, as above, for each direct placement.22 (2) Each such
simple probability has been weighted by the size of the issue to which
it pertains, and weighted average simple probabilities have been ob-
tained quarterly—for industrials,utilities,and financecompanies,
separately. These weighted average simple "probabilities" are given
in Tables 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4 and are shown in Charts 5-1, 5-2, and
5-3 for industrials,utilities, and finance companies, respectively.23
21Noneof the direct placements under study here is convertible.
The Morgan Guaranty series, in effect, reads yield by maturity off a curve,
fitted by hand to issues of comparable coupon. For a description of the sample
of direct placements, see Cohan, op. cit., pp.1 1—17.
The usual market rating is simply an absolute yield differential, stated in
basis points or percentage points, between a base series and the series being
measured. The measure used here is the ratio of the two returns, i.e., the ratio
of the expected return on a government to promised return on a risky security.296 Essays on Interest Rates
TABLE5-2.IndustrialDirectPlacements,Weighted Average Simple
Probabilities, Quarterly, 1951 —61
Year
Quarter
1 2 3 4
1951 .990 .990 .988 .989
1952 .988 .988 .990 .988
1953 .985 .990 .985 .983
1954 .988 .984 .988 .989
1955 .988 .990 .990 .982
1956 .986 .987 .988 .985
1957 .982 .982 .982 .981
1958 .980 .983 .980 .988
1959 .984 .987 .987 .984
1960 .986 .986 .980 .984
1961 .983 .984 .984 .988
NOTE: Average, 1951—61 =.9858.




























































NOTE: Average, 1951—61 =.9885.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 297
TABLE 54. Finance Company Direct Placements,Weighted Average
Simple Probabilities, Quarterly, 1 951—61
Year
Quarter
1 2 3 4
1951 .970 .988 .977 .984
1952 .977 .990 .987 .987
1953 .986 .983 .980 .981
1954 .987 .989 .993 .985
1955 .993 .989 .993 .990
1956 .986 .986 — .982
1957 .985 .979 .983 .980
1958 .978 .979 .983 .982
1959 .985 .988 .987 .988
1960 .987 .987 .978 .982
1961 .980 .979 .989 .983




(3)Next, each individual simple probability was raised to the power
equal to the maturity of the issue in order to obtain the probability
that the realized yield on the issue would be equal to the promised
yield. (4) Each such compound probability was then weighted by the
size of the issue to which it pertained, an4 a weighted average com-
pound probability was obtained quarterly for industrials, utility, and
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CHART 5—3. Finance Company Direct Placements, Weighted Average
Simple Probabilities, Quarterly, 1951—61
Probability
finance company issues, separately. These compound probabilities are
given in Table 5-5 and set forth in Charts 5-4, 5-5, and 5-6.
What the P's Show
The industrial and utility P series (Charts 5-1, 5-2, and 5-3) behave
in much the same way. Each fluctuates more or less randomly around
what is virtually a horizontal line from 1951 to mid-1956. Each then
.98
'52
SouRcE: Table 5—4.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 299
TABLE 5-5. Weighted Probabilities to Maturity, All Series, 1951 —61
Year
and
Quarter Industrials Utilities Finance Companies
1951
1 .809 .742 .784
2 .826 .767 .850
3 .844 .790 .830
4 .756 .743 .785
1952
1 .792 .799 .788
2 .750 .801 .822
3 .799 .747 .766
4 .800 .867 .882
1953
1 .776 .759 .808
2 .832 .825 .773
3 .799 .752 .772
4 .764 .765 .758
1954
1 .753 .769 .817
2 .793 .818 .845
3 .795 .844 .865
4 .808 .826 .817
1955
1 .802 .762 .897
2 .814 .787 .910
3 .845 .863 .892
4 .784 .795 .845
1956
1 .740 .770 .821
2 .761 .798 .801
3 .811 .720 —
4 .734 .730 .799
1957
1 .710 .673 .805
2 .680 .660 .760
3 .687 .686 .768
4 .663 .670 .695




Quarter Industrials Utilities Finance Companies
1958
1 .690 .777 .800
2 .719 .711 .775
3 .729 .757 .736
4 .785 .719 .787
1959
1 .773 .784 .755
2 .773 .848 .803
3 .776 .775 .831
4 .760 .626 .778
1960
1 .782 .751 .792
2 .769 .731 .809
3 .683 .751 .713
4 .726 .702 .782
1961
1 .770. .758 .776
2 .732 .751 .740
3 .752 .796 .804
4 .807 .816 .725
Average
1951—61 .7671 .7632 .7991
1951—53 .7956 .7798 .8015
1959—61 .7586 .7574 .7757
moves persistently downward until 1957—58. Each then recovers and
again begins to fluctuate randomly around a virtually horizontal line.
The finance company P series fluctuates randomly around an upward
trend from 1951 to the end of 1955. It then moves persistently down-
ward until the first quarter of 1958; it then recovers and fluctuates
erratically until the end of the period. The three compounded series
show much the same pattern as their simple counterparts—although,
in all three series, compounding has accentuated the persistent down-
ward movement in the middle of the period.
The persistent downward movement over a three-year period in all
six series could, of course, be taken to mean that the quality of theEx Ante Quality of Direct Placements 301
CHART 5—4.Industrials,Weighted Average Probabilities toMaturity,
Quarterly, 1951—61
Probability
SOURCE: Tables 5—S and 5—11.
SOURCE: Tables 5—5 and 5—11.
CHART 5—5. Utilities, Weighted Average Probabilities to Maturity, Quar-
terly, 1951—61
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CHART 5—6. Finance Companies, Weighted Average Probabilities to Ma-
turity, Quarterly, 1951—61
direct placements bought from 1955 to 1958 declined steadily during
that period or that, for other reasons (e.g., risk aversion), yields on
direct placements rose, relative to yields on governments, as the volume
of lower-grade securities purchased increased.
In an attempt to decide which of these two possibilities was more
likely to be correct, probability ratios were constructed, separately for
industrial, utility, and finance company issues, for an issue of fixed
characteristics.
The procedure was as follows: Quarterly yield series had been con-
structed, for another purpose, for an industrial, a utility, and a finance
company issue, each of fixed characteristics. Each of these series is
analogous to a cost of living index based on a rigidly fixed basket of
commodities.24 Each quarterly return (1 +yield)for each of these
series was then divided into the return during the same quarter on a
comparable government. The resulting "probability ratios" are given
in Table 5-6andin Charts 5-7, 5-8, and 5-9. Inasmuch as each of
the three series is, to repeat, based on a set of fixed characteristics,
i.e., is of constant intrinsic quality, we would have expected the proba-
21Themethod by which these series were constructed is discussed in detail
in Yields on CorporateDebt Directly Placed, NewYork, NBER, 1967, pp. 72—73.
Probability
SOURCE: Tables 5—5 and 5—11.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 303
TABLE 5-6.Direct Placements,Return on Long-Term Governments




Quarter Industrials Utilities Finance Companies
1951
1 .987 .988 .985
2 .994 .990 .984
3 .984 .988 .985
4 .988 .982 .983
1952
1 .986 .992 .983
2 .983 .991 .983
3 .985 .986 .983
4 .987 .984 .982
1953
1 .985 .987 .983
2 .986 .987 .980
3 .987 .988 .980
4 .983 .989 .981
1954
1 .983 .789 .982
2 .984 .988 .983
3 .984 .986 .983
4 .984 .988 .983
1955
1 .989 .990 .987
2 .987 .989 .987
3 .987 .991 .987
4 .985 .990 .986
1956
1 .985 .988 .987
2 .984 .987 .985
3 .983 .986 .984
4 .982 .985 .982




Quarter Industrials Utilities Finance Companies
1957
1 .982 .982 .981
2 .983 .984 .981
3 .981 .983 .9.79
4 .979 .983 .977
1958
1 .978 .986 .983
2 .981 .984 .982
3 .986 .987 .983
4 .985 .988 .983
1959
1 .983 .988 .984
2 .986 .988 .986
3 .984 .987 .83
4 .985 .984 .982
1960.
1 .989 .985 .983
2 .983 .986 .983
3 .979 .985 .911
4 .982 .984 .982
1961
1 .984 .986 .982
2 .984 .985 .981
3 .983 .988 .981
4 .984 .990 .982
bility ratios to fluctuate randomly around a horizontal line if no ex-
traneous influence, such as risk aversion, had been present. But in
fact the three fixed characteristics series behave in much the same way
as the weighted average probability ratios derived .fromactual issues:
the ratio starts to fall in 1955 and continues downward for three
years in the case of industrials, one and a half years in the case of
utilities, and nearly two years in the case of finance companies.
This must mean that, during this period, yields on an industrial
issue, a utility issue, and a finance company issue, each of fixed char-Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 305
CHART 5—7. Industrials, Yield on Long-Term Governments Divided by
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CHART 5—8. Public Utilities, Yield on Long-Term Governments Divided
by Computed Yield on Fixed Characteristic Direct Placements, Quarterly,
1951—61
acteristics, rose relative to yields on governments. And this in turn
would appear to mean that lenders, during the period, regarded an issue
of fixed characteristics as being of progressively decreasing quality. But
the period in question was fairly prosperous and, during such a period,
IIII IIII 11,1 a IIIiii III liii Iiii ii. I I•11
Probability
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CHART 5—9. Finance Companies' Issues, Yield on Long-Term Govern-







wewould expect lenders to regard an issue of fixed characteristics as
being of progressively improving quality rather than the reverse. This
fact suggested the possibility that influences in addition to quality were
affecting the behavior of the probability ratios—perhaps, as suggested
above, the volume of lower-grade issues coming to market during the
years 1955—57. Although the insurance companies themselves may not
be risk averse, the National Association of Life Insurance Commis-
sioners requires progressively higher loss 'reserves against "lower-grade"
securities. This means, among other things, that in years in which the
life insurance companies buy large amounts of lower-grade securities,
their earnings and surplus are less than they otherwise would have been.
This in turn, at least in the short term, may affect the ability of the
insurance companies, both stock and mutual, to pay dividends, reduce
premiums, and so forth.25
In other words,ifinsurance companies were risk-neutral,they
would make a reasonably rapid adjustment to an increase in the de-
mand for long-term money (regardless of quality) by selling govern-
ments and buying direct placements. The adjustment would not be
instantaneous and,therefore, the probability ratio would fluctuate
25Fora comprehensive discussion of this matter, see H. G. Frame, Valuation
of Securities Holdings of Life insurance Companies, Homewood, Illinois, 1962,
Chapter 1 and Appendix A.
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randomly over time, unless lenders believed they were buying direct
placements of progressively higher or lower quality. But if the insur-
ance companies were risk averse, because of the restrictions imposed
on them by NALIC or for other reasons, they would tend to require
relatively higher yields, other things being equal, as volume rose.26
They would, that is, require compensation for the expected value of
the penalties they would incur or for the additional risk implicit in
the purchase of additional securities with a higher-than-average vari-
ance of return. In order to throw some additional light. on this hy-
pothesis, probability ratios were constructed for Aaa and Baa publicly
held outstandings. These ratios are set forth in Table 5-7 and Chart 5-10.
The probability ratio for Aaa's despite a very slight downward trend
in 1956—57 is for all practical purposes fluctuating randomly around a
horizontal line. The probability ratio for Baa's, however, behaves in
much the same way as the probability ratios for the three classes of
direct placements, i.e., it moves sharply downward in the middle of the
period.
If the foregoing hypothesis is correct, we should find a significant
relationship between the volume of direct placement financing and the
compounded probabilities, when allowance is made for changes in the
various quality variables.
CHART 5—10. Return on Long-Term Governments Divided by Return on







Relativeto governments, i.e., the ratio of the return on governments to the
return on direct placements would decline.
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TABLE 5-7. Return on Lorjg-Term Governments Divided by Return on


































































Average, 1951—61 .9968 .9920
NOTE: Return =1+ yield.
The Time Series Regressions
For the purpose of testing the foregoing hypothesis, three series were
available.
(1) Deliveries. This series, based on data collected by the SEC,
gives the dollar volume of (presumably) all direct placements delivered310 Essays on Interest Rates
by borrowers to lenders. The date of delivery bears no necessary rela-
tionship to commitment date—the date on which the amount of the
loan and its terms were agreed to by the borrower and the lender—
but follows it by varying lengths of time depending on expectations as
to the future course of interest rates. If interest rates are expected to
rise, borrowers will try to anticipate their needs as far ahead as possible
and, hence, the lag between commitment and delivery date will increase.
The lag will tend to shorten when interest rates are expected to decline.
But yields on direct placements (and hence the probability ratios)
should be sensitive not to deliveries—which, as indicated above, may
take place long after yield has been fixed—but rather to commitments,
which measure, albeit inversely, the supply of funds available at any
given moment of time.
(2) New Commitments. Data are available monthly, since Septem-
ber 1952, on new commitments made by a large sample of life insur-
ance companies to corporate borrowers.27 This series measures the
dollar volume of new commitments, to be delivered then or at some
subsequent time, made during the month in question by the life insurance
companies to corporate borrowers.28
(3) TotalOutstanding Commitments. To arriveattotalout-
standing commitments at the end of any given period, measure the
dollar volume of funds previously committed but not yet delivered
to(corporate)borrowers,i.e.,the dollar volume of funds newly
committed, but not delivered,during the period just ended plus
commitments made in all periods prior thereto, but not yet delivered.
Total commitments will increase from one period to the next if new
commitments exceed deliveries and will fallif deliveries exceed new
commitments.29 Because a substantial percentage of direct placements
27Thisdoes not include business and commercial mortgages.
28"Aforward investment commitment is a binding agreement on the part of
a lending institution to make available a given amount of funds, upon given
credit terms, at specified dates or over an agreed-on period of time varying from
just over a month to two or three years. The agreement gives the interest rate,
maturity, redemption privileges, and so forth and sets forth a schedule of dis-
bursement or stake-down' of funds...." The"data include some commitments
to bond houses to purchase a given amount of a public issue. Normally, however,
public issues of corporate securities do not give rise to a forward commitment
partly because, to appear in the data, the commitment must have a life of over
one month." James J.O'Leary, "Forward Investment Commitments of Life
Insurance Companies," in The Qualityand Economic Significance of Anticipä-
lionsData, NewYork, NBER, 1960, pp. 325—326.
29TC1—TC0=NC1—D1— where TC1total commitments at the endEx Ante Quality of Direct Placements 311
is below investment grade, this seriesis, in effect, an index of the
volume of lower-grade securities the life insurance companies will
take into their portfolios during the ensuing six to twelve months.3°
It is drawn from the same sample as the series on new commitments
and it also is available only since September 1952.
The three series described above are given in index number form
in Table 5-8 and Chart 5-1 1.31 Chart 5-11 makes clear that new
commitments, which had been fluctuating more orless randomly
(except perhaps for the third quarter of 1954), began a sharp sus-
tained rise in the second quarter of 1955. They "peaked" in the second
quarter of 1956 and then fell steadily until the fourth quarter of 1957.
This rise in new commitments was reflected, with a lag, in the volume
of total commitments which itself peaked in the first quarter of 1957.
Total commitments fell off much more slowly than new commitments
and did not reach bottom until the fourth quarter of 1959.
Regressions were run on the volume of deliveries and the various
quality variables. One regression was run for industrials and one for
utilities over the period 195 1—61, with the quarterly compounded
probabilities as the dependent variable and the quarterly volume of
deliveries and quarterly averages of the ten quality variables as the
explanatory variables. The volume of deliveries was lagged one quarter
in an attempt to make it comparable with the probability ratios, which
were, of course, based on commitment date.
of period 1; TC0 = total commitments at the end of period 0; NC1new com-
mitments made during period1;= deliveries made during period1; and
K1 = cancellations, during period I, of commitments previously made.
There is an analogy here, of course, between shipments (deliveries), new orders
(new commitments), andunfilledorders(totaloutstanding commitments).
Pressure on prices will be greatest when both unfilled orders and new orders
are both high and rising. The correlation between the deliveries series and the
total commitments seriesis—.059 or,forallpractical purposes, zero. The
fact that this correlation is low does not mean, of course, that it could not have
been improved by establishing "appropriate" lag or lead relationships between
them. But given the results presented below, experimentation along these lines
did not seem worthwhile.
See T. R. Atkinson, Trends in Corporate Bond Quality, New York, NBER,
1967, pp. 29—30.
Thecoverage of the two commitments series changed somewhat during the
period. Tn 1952, for example, 58 companies representing 66.6 per cent of the
assets of all U.S. life insurance companies reported commitments. In 1961, 64
companies representing 65.2 per cent of the assets of all U.S. life insurance
companies did so. No attempt has been made to adjust the commitment figures
for these small differences.312 Essays on Interest Rates
TABLE 5-8.Deliveries,Total Commitments, and New Commitments of




Quarter Deliveries Commitments8 Commitmentsb
1951
1 140.8 NA NA
2 92.1 NA NA
3 126.3 NA NA
4 102.6 NA NA
1952
1 125.0 NA NA
2 105.3 NA NA
3 148.7 123.0 NA
4 119.7 96.3 84.5
1953
1 94.7 105.9 119.6
2 110.5 102.2 119.7
3 97.4 100.0 78.8
4 97.4 91.9 81.9
1954
1 94.7 101.5 115.1
2 131.6 99.3 91.7
3 119.7 108.9 153.9
4 118.4 87.4 82.3
1955
1 88.2 85.9 79.2
2 125.0 95.6 120.8
3 105.3 97.0 119.7
4 114.5 92.6 102.8
1956
1 152.6 99.3 118.6
2 126.3 117.8 177.7
3 119.7 135.6 173.1
4 115.8 140.7 127.9






1 117.1 147.4 97.4
2 115.8 145.9 95.0
3 128.9 134.1 66.4
4 125.0 119.3 78.6
1958
1 113.2 118.5 77.1
2 103.9 114.8 94.8
3 100.0 123.7 122.3
4 106.6 102.2 88.4
1959
1 125.0 103.7 92.2
2 118.4 96.3 96.5
3 102.6 80.0 74.9
4 134.2 72.6 74.5
1960
1 111.8 91.9 138.9
2 90.9 89.6 99.3
3 123.7 88.9 95.4
4 123.7 85.2 104.2
1961
1 135.5 89.6 114.8
2 159.2 100.0 159.0
3 163.2 85.2 86.9
4 151.3 74.1 102.8
aTotal commitments outstanding at end of quarter.
bNewcommitmentsmade during quarter.
NA =notavailable.
The quality variables included were those which when calculated
quarterly had shown significance in the cross-section analysis of yields,
as follows:32 X2the mean of the log of the total capital of each
borrower; X3 =themean of the log of the average term of each issue;
82Thesevariables, exceptand X17, are numbered as they are numbered in
the Bureau's study of yields on direct placements (Cohan,. op. cit.). They are
discussed in detail and defined in Chapter 2 of that study.314 Essays on Interest Rates
CHART 5—11. Deliveries, New Commitments, and Total Commitments of
Direct Placements, Quarterly, 1951—61
= the mean of the log of times proforma interest was earned, for
each borrower; X5 = the mean of the lien position of each issue; X6
= the mean of the industrial classification of each issuer; X8 =the
mean of the log of the size of each issue; X12 =themean of the log
of the average earnings of each borrower, before interest and taxes; X13
= the mean of the log of the maturity of each issue; X15 = the mean
of the log of the ratio of total long-term debt to total capital of each
borrower; = the standarddeviationof X8 above; X17 = the
standard deviation of X13, above.33
The last two variables were included in order to try to detect any
variation in the dependent variable due solely to an unusually large
issue or an unusually long maturity. The individual probabilities, as
explained above, were raised to the power represented by the maturity
of the issue in question and then weighted by the amount of that issue.
This procedure meant that the weighted average probability for any
given quarter could be materially affected by a large issue with a long
maturity—if the sample in that quarter happened to be small.
83Thevalues used for the above variables (X2 through X11)are given in
Tables B-6 through B-13 of the study of yields on direct placements. X5 and X0
were coded.
SOURCE: Table 5—8.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 315
The results given by the foregoing regressions were not really satis-
factory and the volume of deliveries showed no significance in either
of them. The R for industrials was .699 and only two variables showed
significance: X4 and The results for utilities were even less satis-
factory than those for industrials: R was .511 and no variable was
significant when all were run simultaneously—although average term
(X3) and coverage (X4) were on the border of being so.
Very high R's had not really been expected primarily because the
dependent variable, a subjective probability, was subject to substantial
errors of measurement. On the other hand, the delivery data did not
really respond to the hypothesis primarily because, as indicated above,
delivery can and often does occur with a substantial lag after commit-
ment date. And this lag itself will tend to vary over time depending on
expectations on the future course of interest rates. This variability of
the lag between commitment and delivery meant that a simple adjust-
ment, such as lagging the deliveries series some fixed interval, would
probably not be satisfactory.
A second set of regressions was then run with the "total commit-
ments" series substituted for the deliveries series. This series was lagged
two quarters, e.g., the volume of commitments at the end of the third
quarter of 1953 was presumed to exert its effect on yields during the
first quarter of 1954, and so forth.34 A two-quarter lag produced a some-
what better fit than a one-quarter lag or no lag at all. This can be
rationalized,readily enough, on the grounds thatitsimply takes
time for lenders to decide whether an increase in loan applications is
merely random and temporary or is likely to be sustained.S5
These regressions were run for the period1953—61instead of for the
period 1951—61 because, as indicated above, the commitments series begins in
1952.
When the regressions were run with no lag, R was .810 for industrials and
.765forutilities. The coefficient on the volume of financing was —.0976
(t= —4.11)for industrials and —.0861 (t= —3.04)for utilities.
The outstanding commitments series began in September of 1952 and, for
this reason, six observations of the original forty-four (four in 1951 and two
in 1952) had to be eliminated. Two additional observations on the dependent
variable had to be eliminated because of the two-quarter lag.
This left thirty-six observations on the dependent variable, i.e., the thirty-six
weighted average beginning in the first quarter of 1953. These thirty-six
were regressed, step-wise and separately for industrials and utilities, on the
eleven quarterly averages listed above.
This process separated thesignificant from the nonsignificant independent
variables and provided estimates of the coefficients for those that had shown316 Essays on Interest Rates
TABLE 5-9. Industrial Direct Placements, Regression of Compound Prob-
abilities on Total Outstanding Commitments and Various Quality Variables,
Significant Coefficients and Standard Errors
Variables abl t
11Volume of financing —.126 1 .0216 —5.84
12Total capital +.0414 .0189 + 2.19
14Times charges earned +.1239 .0299 +4.14
18Size of issue —.0349 .0265 —1.32
Dollars of long-term debtperdollar
of total capital ÷.1433 .0584 +2.45
116Standard deviation of sizeofissue —.0605 .0292 —2.07
NOTE: R =.854;R2 =.730;F =13.04;=.01;standard error of estimate =
.0257;degrees of freedom =29.
The substitution of the commitment series for the deliveries series
improved the results markedly. Table 5-9 summarizes results for in-
dustrials and Table 5-10, for utilities. The R for industrials has risen
to .854 (from .699) and five variables, including the volume of com-
mitments, now show significance at .025 (one tail)or better. The
volume of commitments shows itself to be by far the strongest variable.
TABLE 5-10. Public Utility Direct Placements, Regression of Compound
Probabilities onTotal Outstanding Commitments and Various Quality
Variables, Significant Coefficients and Standard Errors
Variables b1 t
Volume of financing —.1256 .0258 —4.87
13Average term +.0735 .0366 +2.01
14Times charges earned +.1447 .0503 +2.88
Type of Security —.0738 .0375 —1.97
Size of issue —.0244 .0156 —1.56
116Standard deviation of sizeofissue +.0746 .0244 +3.06
Standard deviation of maturity +.2010 .0679 +2.96
NOTE: R =.805;R2 =.648;F =7.36;< .01; standard error of estimate =
.0366;degrees of freedom =28.
significance(see Tables 5-9 and 5-10). No regressions could be run on the
finance company Ps's because satisfactory averages of the independent variables
could not be constructed.Ex Ante Quality of Direci Placements 317
Similar results were obtained for utilities: R rose from .511 to .805
and six variables showed significance at .025 or better. One variable,
X8, showed significance at approximately .05. Again, as for industrials,
the volume of commitments showed itself to be the strongest variable.
Corn puted Probabilities
In order to eliminate the effect on the P11's of fluctuations in the volume
of total commitments, P11'swerecomputed, for both industrials and
utilities, with the volume of financing held constant at its mean value
for the period. The quality variables that had shown significance were,
of course, allowed to vary. The computed P11's are given in Table 5-11
and in Charts 5-4 and 5-5 where they are plotted against the actual'
Pa's. These computed Pa's respond to the question: In the subjective
view of lenders, was the quality of new direct placements, on the
average, improving or worsening after allowance was made for the
effect of the volume of financing? An answer to this question is pro-
vided by Charts 5-4 and 5-5. In both series, the "sag" in the middle
has totally disappeared. Both series now show a slight downward
trend until 1959, then a drop followed by a recovery beginning in the
last quarter of 1960. In the computed series, of course, only the
quality variables are allowed to vary and therefore the movement of the
two series reflects variation in them alone (plus, of course, a random
component)
30 Theadjusted series in Chart 5-6 for finance company issues was obtained
by using the regression coefficient on volume of financing for industrials. This
regressioncoefficient was virtuallyidenticaltothe regressioncoefficient on
volume of financing for utilities (see Tables 5-9 and 5-10). It seemed reason-
able,therefore,to supposethat,had time seriesregressions been runfor
finance company issues, the regression coefficient on volume of financing would
not have differed materially from the other two. In any case, the adjustment
affects the finance company series in much the same way as it affects the other
two series: The systematic downward movement between 1955 and 1957 has
disappeared. The series now shows a slight upward trend from 195 1—57, and a
downward trend thereafter.
The computed probabilities are, in effect, weighted indexes of characteristics
adjusted for the volume of lower-grade financing, the weights given to the
characteristics being held constant through the period. The procedure assumes,
of course, that expectations about future business conditions did not change
systematically in one direction or the other during the period. Experiments with
adjusting the actual Ps's for the effect of the volume of financing suggest that
the foregoing assumption is reasonable.318 Essays on Interest Rates




Quarter Industrials Utilities Finance Companies
1951
1 .800 .743 .775
2 .809 .858 .833
3 .775 .793 .761
4 .755 .815 .784
1952
1 .795 .778 .781
2 .803 .755 .875
3 .775 .802 .742
4 .807 .859 .889
1953
1 .777 .788 .809
2 .762 .757 .703
3 .802 .767 .775
4 .787 .758 .781
1954
1 .757 .778 .821
2 .788 .749 .840
3 .757 .816 .825
4 .773 .811 .782
1955
1 .787 .813 .882
2 .775 .748 .871
3 383 .772 .830
4 .747 .761 .808
1956
1 .752 .747 .833
2 .772 .780 .812
3 .787 .712 —
4 .745 .753 .810
Adjustment for Differential Call Deferment
The probabilities assigned by lenders to new direct placements were




Quarter Industrials Utilities Finance Companies
1957
1 .764 .741 .859
2 .767 .726 .847
3 .751 .772 .832
4 .754 .767 .786
1958
1 .763 .762 .873
2 .770 .786 .826
3 .753 .773 .760
4 .777 .746 .780
1959
1 .791 .761 .773
2 .756 .849 .786
3 .753 .721 .808
4 .729 .687 .747
1960
:1 .731 .755 .741
2 .715 .701 .755
3 .745 .741 .775
4 .703 .682 .759
1961
1 .730 .768 .736
2 .732 .765 .740
3 .742 .740 .794
4 .785 .780 .703
Average
1951—1961 .7655 .7667 .7977
1951—53 .7872 .7894 .7923
1959—61 .7427 .7458 .7597
NOTE: Probabilities were computed on the assumption that total outstanding
commitments remained unchanged during the period.
5-5,and5-11 above, because the probabilities given in those tables
do not take account of differential call deferment between governments
and direct placements. As indicated above, governments are generally
protected from call throughout their lives. The direct placements under320 Essays on interest Rates
study here were protected only for varying relatively small portions
of their lives. Table 5-12 indicates that industrial direct placements
had an average maturity, during the period, of about 16 years. In the
first part of the period (1951—55) they were protected against call,
on the average, for 4.9 years and in the last part of the period (1956—
61) for 7.5 years. But the sixteen-year governments with which they
are compared were, in effect, protected against call through virtually
TABLE 5-12. Direct Placements, Calculation of Adjustment for Differential
Call Deferment Between Direct Placements and Long-Term Governments
1951—55 1956—61
Industrials and Finance
Average maturity (years) 16.1 16.4
Average period of noncallability
(years) 4.9 7.5
Difference 11.2 8.9
Adjustmenta (basis points) 5-14 20b
Utilities
Average maturity (years) 25.2 24.7
Average period of -
noncallability(years) 1.4 5.2
Difference 23.8 19.5
Adjustment (basis points) 11-23 41k'
SOURCE: Avery Cohan, Yields on Corporate Debt Directly Placed, New York,
NBER, 1967, Tables B-8 and B-12.
aSee pp. 319-320.
bFor eight quarters only. Seepp. 319-320.
their whole lives. Some attempt must be made therefore to adjust for
thisdifference—especially because,instinctsuggests,itsimpact on
the compounded probabilities may be large. -.
Thequestion we are asking here, therefore, is:If direct placements
had been protected against call for their whole lives, instead of for
some shorter period, what would the effect have been on the probabil-
ities, simple and compound, given above.
Protection against call is desired by lenders, especially when interest
ratesare high,to prevent refunding should interest ratesdecline.
Most lenders are willing to pay a price, in terms of lower yield, in
order to obtain such protection. Presumably, the longer the period of call
deferment the higher the price they are disposed to pay, that is, the
larger the amount of yield they are willing to sacrifice. Presumably also,
if direct placements had been protected against call for their wholeEx Ante Quality of Direct Placements 321
lives, the yields on them would have been lower and the probabilities
derived above, higher. We adjust the simple probabilities first.
In his recent article, Pye has suggested that, holding quality con-
stant, "for a typical long-term bond with typical call features a discount
of about four basis points is produced by a five-year deferment (of
call)...whenthe one year interest rateisin the lower range
(2%—4 per cent) of those observed form 1959 through 1965.
When the interest rate is in the upper range...(4_514 percent),
a discount of about thirteen basis points is produced."37 Pye also
suggests that when interest rates are in the lower range, "discounts
may be in the area of forty.. basis points" for a thirty-year bond. When
interest rates are in the higher range, the discount for such a bond
might be as much as seventy basis points. Pye made his estimates by
comparing high-grade corporates with varying deferments—maturity
and quality rating held constant. These estimates purport to represent
the price of pure call deferment and we should be able to use them,
therefore, to obtain rough estimates of that part of the yield differential,
between direct placements and governments, that is due to differential
call deferment.88
During the period under study the rate on one-year governments
was above 3% per cent during the last three quarters of 1957, the last
three quarters of 1959, and the first two quarters of 1960, or for eight
quarters in all.
Using this fact, the figures given in Table 5-12, and Pye's Table
we can make rough adjustments in basis points for those quar-
ters during which the one-year government rate was above 3% per
cent and those quarters during which it was at or below 3% per cent,
separately for industrials,utilities, and finance company issues. In
making the adjustment, we have assumed that the difference between
maturity and period of noncallabiity for both periods (see Table
5-12) was 10 years for industrials and 20 years for utilities. This
assumption has been made in order to avoid the hazards of inter-
polating between Pye's estimates, which are for successive five-year
periods in the relevant range.
The adjustments are given in Table They were obtained for
Gordon Pye, op. cit.
98Weassume, in what follows, that governments are noncallable.
89op.cit., p. 630.
'°There are two adjustments under the column 1951—55. One is for those
quarters during which the one-year rate was in the neighborhood of 2½ per322 Essays on Interest Rates
industrials and finance company issues, by first obtaining the discount
for noncallability for fifteen-year bonds from Pye's Table III for each
period—namely, 8 to18, and 29 basis points, respectively. These
figures represent estimates of the prices, in basis points, lenders were
disposed to pay for fifteen years of protection against call when one-
year interest rates were 21/8 per cent (8 basis points), 3% per cent (18
basis points), and 4% per cent (29 basis points). But industrials dur-
ing the period had 5 to 7 years of call protection worth, depending on
the level of the one-year rate, respectively, about 3, 4, and 9 basis
points. The latter figures were therefore substracted from the former
to obtain the adjustments for industrials for differential call of about
ten years, namely, 5, 14, and 20 basis points, for the three levels of the
one-year rate. Finally, the adjustment in basis points was used to adjust
the probabilities both simple and compound. The adjustment for util-
ities was obtained by analogous procedure.
How do the adjustments given in Table 5-12 affect the simple
probabilities given in Tables 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4? The individual prob-
abilities are affected by one-tenth or one-fifth of one per cent or, for
practical purposes, not at all, and the three averages by about one-tenth




Finance companies .9841 .9855
The Compound Probabilities
The quarterly compound probabilities adjusted for the volume effect
(Table 5-11) were adjusted as follows for differential call deferment:
first, weighted average maturities were obtained for each quarter, sep-
arately for industrials, utilities, and the issues of finance companies;
second, the maturities so obtained were used to reduce the compound
probabilities (adjusted for the effect of the volume of financing) to
simple form. For example, the compound probability given in Table
cent and the other when it was in the neighborhood of 3% per cent. There is
only one adjustment under the column 1956—61, because the one-year rate did
not rise above 4% per cent in any quarter during the period 1956—61.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 323
5-11 for industrials for thefirstquarter of 1951 was .800. The
weightedaverage maturity of all industrial direct placements in the
first quarter of 1951 was 21 years.41 The twenty-first root of .800 was
then extracted and found to be approximately .9894. To this simple
probability was added .001 to adjust for call. The resulting figure,
.9904, was then raised to the twenty-first power, yielding a compound
probability of about .817. The figures given in columns 2, 4, and 6 of
Table 5-13 are the result of this process, i.e., they have been adjusted
both for the effect of the volume of financing and for differential
call deferment. Charts 5-12, 5-13, and 5-14 compare the compound
probabilities adjusted for both effects with those adjusted for the
effect of the volume of financing alone.
The compound probabilities adjusted for call and the volume of
financing are all perceptibly higher than those adjusted for the volume




Volume Only Volume and Call
Industrials .7655 .7831
Utilities .7667 .79 54
Finance Companies .7977 .8111
The probabilities continue to show some slight deterioration from
the beginning of the period. The average compound probability for the
direct placements bought in 195 1—53 was .807 for industrials, .809
for utilities, and .803 for finance company issues. For 1959—61, these
probabilities were, respectively, .763, .78 1, and .778, or a deterioration
of 5.5 per cent for industrials, 3.5 per cent for utilities, and 3.1 per cent
for finance company issues. Atkinson's findings (especially his chart
describing the average rating class for the Bureau's sample of direct
placements) conforms, in general, to the findings here. Atkinson qual-
ifies his findings as follows: ".. .apartfrom the fact that the two be-
ginning years (195 1—52) were relatively high in quality and the last
two years of low quality, it could be said that there was no change
based on this measure.
41Weightswere the dollar amount of each issue.
op.cii., pp.30—31.324 Essays on Interest Rates
TA BLE 5-13. Direct Placements, Weigh ted Average Simple Probabilities
Adjusted for Differential Call Deferment and Weighted Average Compound
Probabilities Adjusted for Differential Call Deferment and for the Volume










(1) (3) (4) (5) (6)
1951
1 .989 .809 .988 .762 .964 .778
2 .989 .817 .994 .879 .987 .839
3 .982 .781 .990 .812 .966 .764
4 .989 .765 .993 .838 .984 .790
1952
1 .988 .803 .990 .798 .976 .785
2 .991 .813 .984 .768 .993 .884
3 .989 .784 .992 .823 .985 .750
4 .989 .815 .994 .880 .987 .893
1953
1 .985 .784 .988 .804 .986 .815
2 .986 .769 .990 .778 .977 .708
3 .985 .808 .987 .783 .981 .780
4 .985 .793 .988 .777 .984 .787
1954
1 .988 .766 .987 .793 .987 .827
2 .983 .794 .990 .770 .988 .846
3 .986 .764 .990 .833 .990 .833
4 .986 .780 .991 .831 .983 .788
1955
1 .987 .794 .991 .831 .992 .889
2 .987 .783 .988 .766 .985 .875
3 .986 .790 .990 .792 .988 .836
4 .978 .752 .985 .775 .987 .815
1956
1 .986 .768 .986 .779 .987 .845
2 .988 .789 .989 .815 .987 .825
3 .986 .801 .986 .749 — —
4 .985 .760 .984 .781 .983 .820














1 .986 .779 .987 .813 .989 .871
2 .987 .800 .988 .810 .987 .870
3 .986 .782 .990 .854 .988 .858
4 .988 .790 .990 .852 .987 .815
1958
1 .985 .770 .988 .780 .986 .877
2 .986 .777 .988 .802 .984 .831
3 .982 .765 .988 .807 .985 .774
4 .988 .793 .989 .788 .981 .790
1959
1 .986 .804 .990 .804 .986 .788
2 .986 .771 .992 .884 .982 .796
3 .985 .783 .984 .785 .985 .831
4 .982 .755 .987 .759 .985 .776
1960
1 .983 .758 .987 .825 .984 .769
2 .982 .743 .985 .773 .983 .780
3 .985 .760 .988 .778 .983 .787
4 .982 .717 .986 .722 .979 .769
196.1
1 .979 .741 .990 .811 .977 .746
2 .984 .746 .988 .800 .979 .751
3 .984 .756 .988 .778 .988 .810
4 .987 .799 .991 .825 .983 .717
Average
1951—61 .9856 .7798 .9886 .8018 •9839a 8088a
1951—53 .9872 .7951 .9899 .8087 .9808 .7978
1959—61 .9838 .7611 .9880 .7962 .9827 .7767
NOTE: 1951—53 —Utilitiescomputations based on N =17and N =19. 1951—
61 —Utilitiesaverage rounds the same for N =17or N =19.
aBased on 43 quarters.326 Essays on Interest Rates
CHART 5—12. Industrials, Weighted Average Probabilities to Maturity,
Adjusted for Volume Effect and for Effect of Both Volume and Differential
Call Deferment, Quarterly, 1951—61
Probability
CHART 5—13. Public Utilities, Weighted Average Probabilities to Maturity,
Adjusted for Volume Effect and for Effect of Both Volume and Differential
Call Deferment, Quarterly, 195 1—61
EVALUATION OF RESULTS
Subject to certain qualifications, assumed to be minor, the results
presented above purport to represent the subjective probability as-
signed by lenders to the composite (aggregate) new direct placement
SouRcE: Tables 5—il and 5—13.
SOURCE: Tables 5—11 and 5—13.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 327
CHART 5—14. Finance Companies, Weighted Average Probabilitiesto
Maturity, Adjusted for Volume Effect and for Effect of Both Volume and
Differential Call Deferment, Quarterly, 1951 —61
bought by them in each of the 44 quarters from January 1, 1951, to
December 31, 1961, i.e., the subjective probability that all payments of
interest and principal would be made in full and on time.
ifl principle, the results should be evaluated by trying, a priori, to
decide (a) whether all significant extraneous influences have been re-
moved and (b) whether the assumptions on which the model rests are
reasonably accurate. If these two prerequisites were satisfied, we would
be able to conclude that the results must, in fact, represent a reasonably
accurate image of the subjective views of lenders of the quality of the
issues they bought during the period, at the time they bought those
issues.
But, unhappily, we cannot be sure, a priori, that the prerequisites are
in fact satisfied and therefore a second test has been applied: Are the
probabilities, both simple and compound, reasonably close to recent
realized experience? We would expect "recent realized experience" to
be virtually decisive in estimating current probabilities. We discuss the
simple probabilities first.
Simple Probabilities
Hickman's data, as adjusted by Frame, make it possible to estimate
ex post simple "probabilities" for various classes of issues extinguished
Probobility
SOURCE: Tables 5—11 and 5—13.328 Essays on Interest Rates
during the period of 1.9.00—43,i.e., the respective probabilities that
lenders would have assigned to each issue in each risk class had they
had perfect foresight.43 These probabilities are given, separately fOr in-
dustrials and utilities, by agency rating in Table 5-14. These. prob-
abilities were obtained by dividing the realized yield by the promised











Aaa 1.000. — —
Aa 1.000 .042 .0420
A .994 .076 .0755
Baa .991 .376 .3726
Ba .975 .505 .4924





Aa 1.000 .030 .0300
A .999 ..272 .2717
Baa .992 .222 .2202.
Ba .976 .468 . .4568
B and below — —
Total 1.000 .9867
aComputed from data given in HG. Frame, Valuation of Securities Holdings of
Life Insurance Companies, Homewood, Illinois, 1962, Table 2-8.
bFrom Avery Cohan, Yields on Corporate Debt Directly Placed, New York, NBER,
1.96 7, Table C-3.
yield for each agency rating.44 Each such probability, as explained
above, is the average probability that any single payment will be made
in full and on time and is comparable to the simple probabilities pre-
sented in Tables 5-2, 5-3, and 5-4, above.
Perfectforesight with respect to each risk class but not, of course, with
respect to each issue in each class.
"These yields are weighted average yields. See Hickman, Corporate. Bond
Quality, op. cit., pp. 54ff.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 329
What is the rationale of this procedure, i.e., of obtaining an ex
post probability by dividing the actual realized yield by the promised
yield? The procedure simply assumes that the yield actually realized
should have been used as the discount rate at issue. If it had been,
the present value equation would have been:
1 —rP (1
(1 +++(1 ±
where r is the promised yield on the direct placemenf and g'is the
realized yield on it. Solving this equation for P gives:
—'(1+ g')
—(1+r)'
or the realized yield divided by the promised yield. Table 5-14 shows
that the realized probabilities decline more or less systematically as
quality declines.
We know from the National Bureau's study of direct placements
that about 72 per cent of utility direct placements would probably have
been rated Baa or below by the agencies.45 Moreover, about 50 per
cent of industrials and about 48 per cent of utilities would have prob-
ably been rated Ba or below. If we take weighted averages of the
probabilities in the first column of Table 5-14, using as weights the
percentages given in Table C-3 of the National Bureau's yield study,
we obtain a weighted average of .9825 for industrials and'of .9867 for
utilities.46 The details of the calculation are given in column 3 of
Table 5-14. Tables 5-1, 5-2, and' 5-3 tell us that the average simple
probability for 1951—61 for industrials was .9858, for utilities, .9885,
and for finance companies, .9841. In other words, during the period
1951—61, lenders assigned to new direct placements simple probabil-
ities that were slightly higher than prewar experience suggested should
have been assigned to them. Given the favorable experience since World
War II, this is, of course, what we would have expected a priori.47
'5Cohan, op. cit., pp. 158—161.
'°Inother words, the realizedprobabilities by qualityclass,out of the
Hickman sample, are weighted by the percentage of each quality class in the
direct placement sample. The procedure answers the question:If,during the
period 1951—61 lenders had assigned, to each new direct placement, the proba-
bility indicated by experience to be "appropriate" to it, given its quality, what
would the average probability over all direct placements bought in the years
1951—61 have been?
See Atkinson, op cit., pp. 42ff.330 Essays on Interest Rates
Compound Probabilities
How do the compound probabilities compare with the compound
probabilities implicit in the Hickman-Frame results? In order to answer
this question, weighted average maturities were computed, separately
for industrials and utilities, for the Hickman sample.48
These averages were 16 years for industrials and 24 years for
utilities. When the simple realized probabilities, given above, derived
from the Hickman results are raised to the appropriate power, the
results are approximately: industrials, .754, and utilities, .721; as com-
pared with .783 for industrials, .795 for utilities, and .811 for finance
company issues for the period
The Hickman-Frame data bear, of course, on the period 1900 —43.
What about the period since then? Atkinson has shown that between
1943 and 1965, default rates were very low—about one-tenth of one
per cent on the average for the 22 years.5° This is very much less than
the default rate experienced in any offour decades between 1900—
Thishighly favorable experience, of course, implies much higher
probabilities than lenders fixed during the period, 1951—61. But in in-
terpreting the behavior of lenders in this regard, we should bear in mind
that they have doubtless weighed heavily the fact that borrowers have
experienced little, if any, real adversity since World War II, i.e., bor-
rowers have not had to weather a serious recession. In addition, of
course, the data included in this study do not go beyond 1961. If
data for subsequent years were available they probably would show
that, with quality held constant, the probabilities have trended further
upward since 1961.
In sum, we have now found that both the simple and the compound
ex ante probabilities for the period 1951—61 are perceptibly higher than
the realized probabilities implicit in the Hickman-Frame results cover-
ing the years 1900—43, for approximately comparable issues. This
undoubtedly reflects the highly favorable experience of lenders since
World War II.
Hickman, Statistical Measures, op. cit., Table 94.
The figures used for 1951—1961 are from Table 5-13, i.e., they are adjusted
for the effect of both volume and differential call deferment.
Thatis, of the amount in good standing at the beginning of each year.
Atkinson, op. cit., p. 43.
Atkinsongives the following rates: 1900—09— 0.9 per cent; 1910— 19— 2.0
per cent; 1920— 29 —1.0per cent; 1930— 39— 3.2 per cent.Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 331
But now, do the results presented above represent also a reasonably
accurate image of the objective probabilities—as distinct from what
lenders, ex ante, thought the objective probabilities were? Thisis
equivalent to asking whether the subjective probabilities are likely to
turn out to be good predictors of the eventual outcome.
The short answer to this question is, of course, that the subjective
probabilities do not purport to be predictors: in assigning probabilities
to issues being bought currently, lenders can obviously be wrong, one
way or the other, about the probabilities they assign to the various
"states of nature."52 And if they are wrong, realized results will be
different from expected results.
Nevertheless, we may learn something about the relationship between
the subjective and the objective probabilities by comparing the sub-
jective ex ante probabilities implicit in the Hickman-Frame data with
the estimated "realized probabilities" given above. In other words,
the comparison is between the ex ante probabilities and the realized
probabilities both derived from the Hickman-Frame data. This com-
parison is a precarious undertaking, at best, primarily because Hick-
man calculated market ratings by using yields on the best corporate
bonds (which, in fact, are not riskiess) rather than yields on govern-
ments.53 Moreover, the great bulk of the bonds in his sample were
callable in less than one year. The procedure here is based on the as-
sumption that these two effects are approximately offsetting. Thus, if
the return on the best corporates were 1.04 and the promised return
on a callable risky security were 1.06, Hickman's market rating would
be the difference between the two, multiplied by 100. A corresponding
probability would be .9811 (1.04/1.06 =.9811).Now, if each of the
two returns is reduced by 25 basis points, in order to reduce the num-
erator to approximately the level of a government and in order to ad-
just the denominator for differential call deferment, the result is the
same to the fourth decimal place (1.0375/1.0575 = .9811). In cal-
culating the Hickman-Frame ex ante probabilities, the midpoints of
their class intervals have been used.54
For each of their market-rating classes the following steps were
taken: first, a comparable riskless return was obtained by subtracting
the midpoint of the market rating from the promised return, e.g., for
seems highly likely that lenders would be able to assign probabilities,
with a high degree of accuracy, to the risk of default given the state of nature.
Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality, op. cit., p. 282.
SeeFrame, op. cit.,Table2-9, pp. 50—51.332 Essays on interest Rates
market-rating class 1, industrials, 1.0330 —.0025= An es-
timated cx ante probability was then obtained by dividing this figure
by the promised return, 1.0305/1:0330 =.998(see Table 5-15).
Unhappily, we cannot obtain the corresponding compound ex ante
probabilities for the Hickman sample because data on maturity by
market rating are not available. But the results suggest that the dif-
ferences between the ex ante simple probabilities and the eventual out-
TABLE 5-15. Hickman—Frame Sample of Corporate Bonds, Estimated Ex
Ante and Realized Probabilities, 1900—43
Ex Ante Realized
Market Rating Probability Probability
(basis points) . P P
(1) (2) (3) .
INDUSTRIALS
Under 50 ( .998 1.000
50—100 ( 75) .993 .999
100—150 (125) .988 .995
150—200 (175) .983 .989 •




Under 50 ( .998 .999
50—100 ( 50) .993 .997
100—150 (125) .988 .995
150—200 (175) .989
200—250 (225) .970 .992
250 and
over(275) .975 .981
8Midpoint of class interval
come for the Hickman sample were substantial—especially in the lower
Subtracting the midpoint produces an estimated yield on a best bond of
the same maturity. See Hickman, Corporate Bond Quality, op. cit., pp. 282—283.
For example, for industrials,if we assume that the issues in the poorest
class had an average maturity of 10 years, the compound cx ante and "realized"
probabilities would be respectively (•974)b0and(.987)10 or .768 and .877. This
would mean that although 23.2 per cent of the issues in that class were expected
to default, only 12.3 per cent actually did so. At fifteen years the corresponding
figures would be .673 (ex ante) and .821 (realized).Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 333
Frame does, however, give weighted average promised and realized
yields over all utilities and all industrials separately. And we are able,
with his figures, to compute a weighted average market rating. This is
done in Tables 5-16 and 5-17. With these three figures, namely,
weighted average promised and realized yields and weighted average
TABLE 5-16. Hickman—Frame Sample of Corporate Bonds, Derivation of
Mean Market Rating for Utilities, 1900—43
- Column1
Market Rating . Dollar Amount x









NOTE: 2287.5 =100basis points, mean market rating.
22.9
SOURCE: Column 1—Table 5-15, column 1; column 2—H.G. Frame, Valuation of
Securities Holdings of Life Insurance Companies, Homewood, Illinois, 1962, Table 2-9.
TABLE 5-17. Hickman—Frame Sample of Corporate Bonds, Derivation of
Mean Market Rating for Industrials, 1900—43
Column1
Market Rating Dollar Amount x









NOTE: 1727.5 =138basis points, mean market rating.
12.5
SOURCE: Same as Table 5-16.334 Essays on Interest Rates
market ratings (and using the weighted average maturities computed
above for the Hickman-Frame sample), we are able to compute ex
ante and realized compound probabilities for all utilities separately and
for all industrials separately. These are given in Table 5-18. In in-
terpreting these figures we should bear in mind that lower grade bonds
obviously did much less well than high grade bonds. We may guess
that for bonds graded Baa and below the ex ante probabilities were
10—15 per cent below "realized" probabilities. Perhaps this will also
turn out to be the case for the direct placements bought during the
years 1951—61.
TABLE 5-18. Hickman—Frame Sample of Corporate Bonds, Comparison of
Estimated Simple and Compound Ex Ante Probabilities With "Realized"
Simple and Compound Probabilities, 1900—43
Probabilities Industrials Utilities
Simple
Ex ante .990 .990
Realized .991 .991
Compound






SOURCE: Same as Table 5-16.
In summary:
(1) The simple subjective probabilities found here, covering the
period 1951—61, are somewhat higher than the simple "realized prob-
ablities" implicit in the Hickman-Frame results for the period 1900—43.
This is true for the simple probabilities both unadjusted and adjusted
for differential call deferment.
(2) When the simple probabilities, adjusted for differential call de-
ferment are compounded, they(the compound probabilities)are
found to be considerably higher than the compound "realized prob-
abilities" implicit in the Hickman-Frame results.
(3) Both (1) and (2) are what one would expect given the favor-Ex Ante Quality of Direct Placements 335
able climate and experience that have characterized the period since
1943.
(4) When the Hickman-Frame "realized" simple probabilities are
compared with rough estimates of the ex ante simple probabilities im-
plicit in their data, the latter are found to be smaller than the former—
and the difference increases as quality worsens. This result may mean
that lenders anticipated economic conditions substantially worse than
those that in fact occurred.57 But it may mean that during the period
1900— 43 lenders were strongly risk averse and therefore insisted on
extra risk premium, especially on lower grade issues. In trying to decide
whether and to what extent this factor has influenced the results for
direct placements for the period 1951—61, we should bear in mind
that during the period 1900—43 the buyers of corporate bonds were,
to a large extent, a multitude of individual investors who were, for the
most part, unable to diversify. The buyers of direct placements, on the
other hand, are sixty or more large financial institutions who, for the
most part, understand diversification and practice it.58
(5) Compound ex ante probabilities could not be computed, by
market rating, for the Hickman-Frame sample because data on ma-
turity by market rating were not available. Compound probabilities were
computed, however, for all industrials together and all utilities together.
They were found to be about 5 per cent below the "realized" proba-
bilities implicit in the Hickman-Frame results.
CONCLUSION
As indicated at the outset, this. study has been exploratory. It has at-
tempted to ascertain whether the subjective probabilities present(if
only subconsciously) in the mind of lenders when they fix yields on
new issues can be derived from the observed ratios between ex ante
returns on government bonds, presumed riskless, and cx ante returns on
direct placements of the same maturity. Two major adjustments of the
observed ratios have been made, one for the effect of the volume of
financing and the other for the effect of differential call deferment.
In assessing this possibility we should bear in mind that $27,151 million of
the bonds in Hickman's sample were extinguished before 1931. This just
slightly less than the volume of bonds still outstanding on January1, 1931—
$28,555 million.
They are presumed here to be "risk averse" only because of the penalties
imposed by the NALIC on purchases of low grade securities. See above, p. 304.336 Essays on interest Rates
On the whole, the results seem reasonable. Perhaps, therefore, the
conclusion is warranted that the techniques used merit further con-
sideration—especially for the purpose of assessing the ex ante quality
of new issues—and especially if more refined adjustments could be
made for call deferments and if an adjustment could be included, for
differential transactions costs.